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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This appeal is from the Minute Entry, dated April 1, 1994; Order
Granting Summary Judgment dated May 9, 1994; Minute Entry dated June
22, 1994; Order dated July 18, 1994 (denying Motion for Reconsideration)
entered by Judge Timothy R. Hanson of the Third District Court. The Court
of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(d)
U.C.A., as amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE I
Did the trial court commit reversible error in finding
that there were no issues of material fact in
connection with defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment in face of plaintiff's unequivocal denial of
defendant's statement of undisputed facts?
Standard of Review for Issue I
In reviewing decisions of the trial courts, this Court accords the trial
court's statement of law, statutory interpretation, and/or legal conclusions no
particular deference but reviews them for correctness. State of Humphrey.
823 P. 2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991); City of Monticello v. Christensen. 788 P., 2d
513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 11 S.Ct. 120 (1990); Bountiful v. Rilev. 78 P.
2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989); Smith v. Smith. 793 P. 2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct.

1

App. 1990).
In reviewing a trial court's findings of fact, the appellate court must
reject said findings of fact if there was not sufficient evidence to support such
a finding. Deference is to be given the trier of fact.
ISSUED
Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying
plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration in the face of
plaintiff's prior counsel's affidavit that no agreement
as to the final amount of the purported settlement had
ever been reached?
Standard of Review for Issue II
In reviewing decisions of the trial courts, this Court accords the trial
court's statement of law, statutory interpretation, and/or legal conclusions no
particular deference but reviews them for correctness. State of Humphrey.
823 P. 2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991); Citv of Monticello v. Christensen. 788 P., 2d
513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 11 S.Ct. 120 (1990); Bountiful v. Rilev. 78 P.
2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989); Smith v. Smith. 793 P. 2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
In reviewing a trial court's findings of fact, the appellate court must
reject said findings of fact if there was not sufficient evidence to support such
a finding. Deference is to be given the trier of fact.

2

DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following court rules and/or statutes are reproduced and can be
found in the addenda to this brief, Addendum A.
Ut.R.C.Proc., Rule 56
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501
STATEMENT OF CASE
Gary A. Porter ("Porter") was hired to perform excavation work on a
project for defendant West American Finance Corporation ("West
American"). Porter was not paid for the work performed, liened the job on
October 30,1992 and filed suit in May of 1993 to collect and foreclose on the
lien. The principal balance due to plaintiff/appellant Porter was $25,827.50.
Settlement negotiations began. West American made numerous offers, and
sent settlement checks in October and November of 1993 in the hope that
Porter would accept them. But, Porter never agreed to the amounts offered,
revoked all prior offers in early December, and returned the checks in
January of 1994. West American answered and then filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment claiming that a settlement (accord and satisfaction) had
been reached. Porter opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment with a flat,
unequivocal denial that any settlement had been reached. Yet, Judge Hanson
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ruled that because (1) West American's attorney said that he had reached a
settlement with Porter's prior attorney, Dale Dorius, and (2) Porter did not
produce an affidavit from Dale Dorius denying that a settlement had been
reached, there was "no issue of material fact" as to whether Dorius had
entered into a settlement on Porter's behalf ~ and granted summary
judgment. Porter moved for reconsideration, and produced an affidavit from
attorney Dorius which supported Porter's statement that there had been no
settlement. But, Judge Hanson still refused to reverse himself and let the
Summary Judgment stand. Porter has filed this appeal because he feels that
he properly and completely disputed West American's statement of facts,
thereby creating a dispute as to material fact, which should have precluded
summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Gary A. Porter completed work on an excavation project for West
American on October 10,1992, with a balance due of approximately $25,600.
When West American did not pay Porter for this work, Porter filed a lien on
the project on October 30, 1992. West American still did not pay Porter for
the work performed. In May of 1993, Porter's then attorney, Dale Dorius
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("Dorius") filed suit to collect the monies due to Porter. In June of 1993,
Porter filed an Amended Complaint.
Settlement discussions began. As of August 31, 1993, Porter offered to
settle for $25,600, less $3135.00, plus interest at 8% from the date of filing the
mechanic's lien (October 30, 1992) and $1,500.00 for attorney's fees (see
Dorius letter to West American attorney Steven Lybbert ("Lybbert") attached
hereto as Exhibit A). West American rejected this proposal, indicating that
it would pay interest, but not attorney's fees, and asked for an additional
discount for monies purportedly paid by West American to one of Porter's
subcontractors, Pioneer Sand and Grave ("Pioneer"). In this regard, on
October 19, 1993, Lybbert wrote a letter, with attached accounting, claiming
that West American had paid Pioneer $7666.00, which amount he deducted
from the proposed settlement amount, and tendered a check to Porter for
$15,591.42 (a copy of Lybbert's letter to Dorius dated October 19, 1993 is
attached hereto as Exhibit B).
Porter did not agree with this proposal, challenging the figures used by
Lybbert and the assertion that West American should get an additional
$7666.00 discount in addition to the $3135 discount which Porter had offered
on August 31, 1993. Trying to assuage Porter's concerns and convince him
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to agree to the additional $7666.00 discount being requested, Mr. Lybbert
wrote a letter to Dorius dated October 28, 1993, enclosing a copy of the front
and back of the West American check to Pioneer, and a new set of
calculations -- stating that it appeared to Mr. Lybbert that if Porter agreed
with the $7666.00 discount due to the Pioneer payment, an additional $637.20
would be owed by West American to Porter (a copy of Lybbert's October 28,
1993 letter to Dorius is attached hereto as Exhibit C).
This prompted Dorius to fax a letter dated October 28, 1993 to Porter,
attaching a copy of the Pioneer check, stating that it looked like West
American would owe another $637.20 if Porter agreed to the $7666.00
discount for the Pioneer payment - AND ASKING IF PORTER WOULD
AGREE TO SUCH A SETTLEMENT. A copy of this letter is attached hereto
as Exhibit D). Clearly, no settlement had yet been reached - Porter had not
agreed to the additional $7666.00 discount requested by West American.
In fact, on October 28, 1993, Porter faxed Dorius a letter and
accounting disputing West American's claim for a set off of $7666.00 (because
Pioneer's bill had only been for $7044.75, and Pioneer could not find a
payment from West American for $6476), and instructing Dorius that Porter
would not agree to the $3135.00 discount and the $7044.75 Pioneer discount.

6

A copy of this letter from Porter to Dorius is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
Clearly, there had been no meeting of the minds on settlement.
On November 5, 1993, Mr. Lybbert wrote Dorius a letter (Exhibit F)
setting forth new calculations — assuming that Porter would agree to the
additional $7666.00 discount being requested by West American (but to which
Porter had already told Dorius that Porter would not agree) ~ which Mr.
Lybbert claimed showed that West American would only owe $216.00 more
(in addition to the previously tendered check in the amount of $15,591.42).
Mr. Lybbert tendered an additional check in the amount of $216.00 ~
bringing the total tendered to $15,807.42 - with another letter to Dorius dated
November 12, 1993 (Exhibit G).
On November 23, 1993, Dorius wrote Porter a letter claiming to be
confused as to why Porter was "claimpng] that you are still owed $3,100.00
over [West American's] offer" and asking Porter to fax to Dorius a copy of
Porter's accounting. A copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit H.
Two things are obvious from this letter: (1) Dorius wants to settle the case —
but (2) his client, Mr. Porter does not and has not yet agreed to settle.
On December 13, 1993, Mr. Lybbert filed an answer to the Amended
Complaint, and sent a letter to Dorius complaining that he thought that there
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had been an agreement, but making a "final offer" of settlement (A copy of
which letter is attached hereto as Exhibit F) - which "final offer" was not
accepted by Porter.
On or about January 18, 1994, West American filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment claiming that a settlement had been reached, the agreed
upon funds had been tendered, and had not been returned. Specifically, West
American's "Undisputed Facts" were as follows:
1. Between August 24, 1993 and August 31, 1993 the
parties, negotiating through their attorneys, reached an agreement
that defendants would pay the principal amount of plaintiffs
claim, less a $3135 offset in compromise of a claim by defendants
that they were entitled to an $11,500 offset.
2. Between August 31, 1993 and September 27, 1993 the
parties, still negotiating through their attorneys, agreed that
defendants would pay interest on the principal amount of
plaintiffs claim, less the offset, at 8% per annum from the date
plaintiffs mechanic's lien was recorded.
3. On October 19, 1993 West American sent a check to
plaintiffs attorney for $15,591.42 "in full settlement of the abovereferenced action."
4. After further discussions between counsel for each side,
West American Finance offered to pay another $216 "in order to
finally settle this matter."
5. After being instructed to do so by plaintiffs attorney,
defendants' attorney forwarded a check from West American
Finance to plaintiffs attorney on November 12,1993 for $216.00.
The letter which accompanied the check stated, in part:
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"Enclosed please find my client's check for $216.00 which, when
added to the $15,591.42 previously tendered, is full settlement of
the above-referenced action.
6. As of this date the two checks tendered by West
American Finance to plaintiffs attorney have not been returned.
(Query whether this statement of undisputed facts is sufficient to
warrant the granting of summary judgment.)
Also in support of this motion, West American offered the affidavit of
its counsel, Mr. Lybbert. On the issue of settlement, Mr. Lybbert stated in
paragraph 13 that "Sometime between November 5 and November 11, 1993
I again discussed the matter with Mr. Dorius by telephone. He instructed me
to obtain a second check from West American so that the matter could be
finally settled." In paragraph 14, Mr. Lybbert stated that in a telephone
conversation with Mr. Dorius in early December, "Mr. Dorius did not deny
that a settlement had been reached. He merely stated that he would contact
Mr. Porter."
Upon these two statements alone West American argued that a binding
agreement was entered into between West American and Porter to settle the
case — there is nothing in writing from Porter or Dorius which ever accepted
the settlement proposals being made by West American. The only written
offer ever made by Porter was the August 31,1993 offer » which was rejected
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by West American's September 16, 1993 counteroffer. Neither Porter nor
Dorius ever expressly indicated acceptance of any of West American's many
written offers thereafter.
More importantly — Mr. Dorius' statements, as reported by Mr.
Lybbert in his affidavit, do not constitute an acceptance of West American's
settlement offers. In the November conversation, Dorius merely said some
thing like "get me a check" for the additional $216 being offered by West
American. This was not an acceptance. It was a request by an attorney who
is trying to get his client to agree to a settlement, to get a check in hand so
that he can dangle it under his client's nose in an effort to try and get the
client to agree. There mere asking for an additional check is not, in and of
itself, evidence of an agreement.
In the December conversation, Mr. Lybbert properly and honestly states
that Mr. Dorius "did not deny" that there had been a settlement. It is obvious
that Mr. Dorius also did not say that there had been an agreement either.
Nothing of probative value can be derived from Mr. Dorius' silence, or nonresponse — other than that Mr. Dorius did not or could not give an answer
affirming that an agreement had been reached.
Porter opposed West American's Motion for Summary Judgment with
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the following Statement of Disputed Facts, supported by the sworn verification
of Gary A. Porter:
1. Plaintiff admits that the parties discussed settlement, but
denies that any agreement was reached (refutes Defendants'
Statement of Facts Nos. 1-6).
2. From the letters attached to the Affidavit of Steven H.
Lybbert as exhibits, the following chronology is apparent:
(a) On August 31, 1993, defendants offered to settle
for $22,465 (the principal less $3135) plus an additional discount
for payments purportedly made by defendants to one of plaintiffs
suppliers (See Exhibit A to the Lybbert Affidavit);
(b) Plaintiff counter-offered that he would agree to a
total discount of $3135 in settlement of his claims — no agreement
to any additional discount for the purported payments to
plaintiffs supplier (See Exhibit B to the Lybbert Affidavit);
(c) Defendants continued to try and get plaintiff to
agree to the $3135 discount plus an additional discount for the
purported payment to plaintiffs supplier (See Exhibits C through
F to the Lybbert Affidavit);
(d) But, the plaintiff never acknowledged in writing
or otherwise that these counter-proposals were acceptable —
rather, on December 8, 1993, plaintiff documented his position
that no discount beyond the $3135 was ever agreed to by him (See
Exhibit G to the Lybbert Affidavit), (refutes Defendants'
Statement of Undisputed Facts Nos. 1-6)
3. Upon the withdrawal of Dale Dorius as counsel for
plaintiff herein, all checks tendered by defendants were returned
to Mr. Lybbert (refutes Defendants' Statement of Undisputed
Facts No. 6).
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West American replied to this flat, unequivocal denial of West
American's statement of undisputed facts with essentially two arguments: (1)
although the letters attached to Mr. Lybbert's affidavit do not themselves
demonstrate that a settlement was reached, Mr. Lybbert's statements in his
affidavit in paragraphs 13 and 14 (quoted above in this brief) do show that a
settlement had been agreed to; and (2) if Dorius had not in fact agreed to a
settlement, why didn't Porter produce an affidavit from Dorius refuting
Lybbert's claims.
The trial court, in its minute entry dated April 1, 1994, adopted West
American's argument in Reply, and ruled that based upon Lybbert's
testimony in paragraphs 13 and 14, which had not been refuted by an
affidavit from Dorius himself (rather than from Porter), a settlement had been
reached "sometime between November 5, 1993 and November 11, 1993."
Porter objected to this ruling, and filed his Motion for Reconsideration.
Prior to filing said motion, Porter's current counsel wrote a letter to Dorius
on or about April 12, 1994, asking Porter to provide an affidavit stating that
no settlement had been reached. Dorius failed to do so, so the Motion for
Reconsideration was not initially supported by an affidavit from Mr. Dorius.
However, Porter's current counsel wrote a second letter to Mr. Dorius on or
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about May 14, 1994 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit J) asking
for clarification as to whether a settlement had been entered into or not. In
response to this letter, Mr. Dorius provided the trial court with an affidavit
that he drafted (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit K), which stated
the following:
"3. That there was an agreed to settlement of the principal
amount owed to Plaintiff plus eight percent interest minus
$3135.00, and Defendant would drop the $11,000.00 counterclaim
set off.
4. There was not a finalized agreement as to the amount
that Defendant could offset for the Pioneer Truck charges.
5. The outstanding issue is whether or not Defendant paid
Pioneer Trucking, and if these amounts are proper offsets. This
appears to be the only dispute in regard to the settlement."
Despite Porter having provided the trial court with this unequivocal
denial from Dorius that a final agreement had been reached, Judge Hanson
denied Porter's motion for reconsideration.
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT
The Rules of Civil Procedure, Code of Judicial Administration and
statutory law all require a trial court to deny a motion for summary judgment
whenever the opposing party (1) sets forth a statement of disputed facts in his
opposing memorandum which disputes the moving party's statement of
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undisputed facts, and (2) which statement of disputed facts is supported by
sworn testimony. In this case, Porter's statement of disputed facts clearly
places every fact alleged by West American in dispute, and is supported by the
sworn verification of Gary A. Porter. Further, the trial court's decision to
consider attorney Lybbert's affidavit to be more convincing than plaintiff
Porter's sworn verification refuting the same, violated the requirement that
the trial court construe the evidence presented in connection with a motion for
summary judgment in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Finally,
when Porter ultimately was able to produce an affidavit from attorney Dori us
which refuted Lybbert's affidavit, the trial court abused its discretion in
ignoring this testimony and allowing the Summary Judgment to stand.
ARGUMENT
Point I
Plaintiffs flat and unequivocal denial, under oath, of
the facts upon which defendant relied for defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment was sufficient to
preclude the granting of Summary Judgment.
A motion for summary judgment can only be granted if the trial court
finds, as a matter of law, that there is no dispute as to any material fact.
Further, in deciding whether or not there is a dispute as to material fact, the
trial court
14

is required to give every benefit of the doubt to the party opposing the motion
— all inferences are to be drawn in favor of the opposing party. If, after
strictly applying these rules designed to protect a party's right to his or her
day in court, a trial court can honestly say that there is no issue of material
fact, then summary adjudication is warranted.
However, if the opposing party flatly and squarely disputes the factual
allegations contained in the moving party's statement of undisputed facts, the
motion for summary judgment must be denied. In this case, West American
set forth its "Undisputed Facts" in six numbered paragraphs. Nowhere in
these six paragraphs does West American state that a final agreement was
reached which is binding upon Porter.
sufficient to warrant a reversal.

This deficiency alone should be

Furthermore, Porter's "Statement of

Disputed Facts" squarely denies that a settlement was ever reached - and
clearly states why. Summary Judgment could not and should not have been
granted under these circumstances.
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Point II
Mr. Dorius' Affidavit supplied to the Court in connection with
plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, corroborated plaintiff's
prior statements under oath disputing the defendant's assertion
that a settlement had been reached — the Motion for
Reconsideration should have been granted.
Porter was justifiably shocked when the trial court ignored his clear and
direct refutation of West American's assertion that a settlement had been
reached. However, he immediately set about to obtain the "new evidence"
which had not been before the trial court - an affidavit from Mr. Dorius
refuting Mr. Lybbert's affidavit. With some difficulty, Porter was finally able
to provide the Court which just such an affidavit, albeit in a Reply brief.
This affidavit was properly before the trial court. The purpose of a Motion
for Reconsideration is to bring just such new evidence to the trier of fact's
attention. The new affidavit clearly demonstrated that summary judgment
was not appropriate in this case ~ there simply never was a meeting of the
minds on a settlement in this matter. The trial court abused its discretion in
ignoring this critical new evidence and not setting aside the summary
judgment.

1$

CONCLUSION
This is really a simple appeal. All of the rules governing the granting
of summary judgment were violated in this case.

The moving party's

statement of undisputed facts was insufficient to warrant the granting of
summary judgment. The trial court ignored the fact that Porter disputed each
of West American's "Undisputed Facts," and improperly gave greater weight
to West American's affidavit than to Porter's sworn verification of his
"Statement of Disputed Facts." Finally, the trial court improperly failed to
set aside the summary judgment despite the fact that Porter had provided the
Court with attorney Dorms' sworn affidavit refuting the fundamental assertion
that a settlement had actually been reached. The summary judgment granted
herein must be set aside, and Mr. Porter allowed his day in court.
DATED the 6th day of February, 1995.

sy>
Steffensen
for Appell
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of February, 1995, I caused four
true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be

xxx

postage prepaid; and a single copy to be hand-delivered by xxx
and/or by

personal delivery; addressed to:

LAW OFFICE OF STEVEN H. LYBBERT
Attn: Steven H. Lybbert
Suite 302 Felt Building
341 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Fax (801) 363-8512

IS

mailed,
fax
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from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the
tame have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must,
within two days after the costs have been taxed or
ascertained, in any case where not included in the
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the
judgment docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.)
Rule 55. Default.
(a) Default
* (1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk
shall enter his default.
(2) Notice to party in default After the
entry of the default of any party, as provided in
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding,
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or
in the event that it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of
damages of the nondefaulting party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a
sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served
otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the
amount due and costs against the defendant, if
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if
he is not an infant or incompetent person.
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is
necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it
deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default For good cause shown
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimant*. The provisions of this rule apply whether the
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Rule 56. Summary judgment
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-

ration of 20 days from the commencement of the i
tion or after service of a motion for summary ju
ment by the adverse party, move with or without a
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his & |
vor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-]]
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the 1
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to tha|
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. Thel*
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if thej
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,!
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, i
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any'
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to *1
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, J|
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the!
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine]
issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on J
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered up
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial i
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, 1
examining the pleadings and the evidence before*]
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable i
certain what material facts exist without substanti
controversy and what material facts are actually and j
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make]
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-1
stantial controversy, including the extent to which |
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contra* J
versy, and directing such further proceedings in 1
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and t
trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony;
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidav
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set foi
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, •
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is compefc
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or <
tified copies of ail papers or parts thereof referred i
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served!
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be t
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to i
terrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion i
summary judgment is made and supported as
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest i
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,1
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided!
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing i "
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does notl
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall %
entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should |
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing i
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present 1
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, 1
court may refuse the application for judgment or i
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to 1
had or may make such other order as is just
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it.
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time 1
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this i
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose!
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party i

ploying them to pejti
the reasonable expert
vits caused him tq j |
ney's fees, and anyfi
be adjudged guilty «
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appeal is not affected
this provision.
(e) Judgment after
dies after a verdict or <
and before judgment, j
rendered thereon.
if) Judgment by ©
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seeking the same must
in which the judgment
verified by the defend
(1) If thejudgme
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(Amended effective Se

restrictions, limitations or requirements as the
regulating authority deems appropriate; to suspend the surety's qualification pending compliance with specified provisions of this rule; or to
disqualify the surety. The decision shall be based
on the facts appearing in the file maintained by
the regulating authority and the facts presented
in evidence at the hearing. The decision shall
include the reasons therefor, notice of any right
of review, and the time limit for filing for such a
review. The decision shall be served upon the
surety by mailing the same, via first class mail,
to the surety's last known address on file with
the regulating authority.
(H) Any party aggrieved by the decision of the
regulating authority may file a petition for judicial review within thirty days after the date of
the decision. Judicial review shall be governed by
the procedures set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-15.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991;
January 1, 1992; February 1, 1993.)
Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record.

Intent:
To designate locations of trial courts of record.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby designated as locations of trial courts
of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar City;
Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park
City; Roosevelt; Roy; Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork;
West Valley City.
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial
court of record of any subject matter jurisdiction may
hold court in any location designated by this rule.
(Added effective January 1, 1992.)
ARTICLE 5.
CIVIL PRACTICE.
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions,
supporting memoranda and documents with the
court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting
and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts except proceedings before the
court commissioners and the small claims department of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to
petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters,
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and

copies of or citations by page number to relevant 1
portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-I
ments relied upon in support of the motion. Mem^l
oranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not 1
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the \
"statement of material facts" as provided in para*"
graph (2), except as waived by order of the court |
on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte applies*:]
tion is made to file an over-length memorandum, j
the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in 1
excess of ten pages, the application shall include J
a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed \
five pages.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion.
The responding party shall file and serve upon
all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion,
and all supporting documentation. If the re*.
sponding party fails to file a memorandum in op-|
position to the motion within ten days after seT*!
vice of the motion, the moving party may notifyf
the clerk to submit the matter to the court fori
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this J
rule.
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving partyl
may serve and file a reply memorandum withinl
five days after service of the responding party's <
memorandum.
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the
expiration of the five-day period to file a reply \
memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk J
to submit the matter to the court for decisional
The notification shall be in the form of a separatej
written pleading and captioned "Notice to
mit for Decision." The notification shall containj
certificate of mailing to all parties. If neitl
party files a notice, the motion will not be su
mitted for decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion*!
The points and authorities in support of a motion"
for summary judgment shall begin with a section ;
that contains a concise statement of material
facts as to which movant contends no genuine,
issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separata 1
numbered sentences and shall specifically refei
to those portions of the record upon which
movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a mq
tion. The points and authorities in opposition I
a motion for summary judgment shall begin wit]
a section that contains a concise statement of i
terial facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be1
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall
specifically refer to those portions of the record ;
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if ap-;
plicable, shall state the numbered sentence or \
sentences of the movant's facts that are dispute
All material facts set forth in the movant's stato
ment and properly supported by an accurate \
erence to the record shall be deemed admitted i
the purpose of summary judgment unless i
cally controverted by the opposing party's stati
ment.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered 1
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, c
requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below.
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(b) In cases where the granting of a motion
would dispose of the action or any issues in the
• action on the merits with prejudice, either party
at the time of filing the principal memorandum
j, in support of or in opposition to a motion may file
^a written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to
\ the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive
i issue or set of issues governing the granting or
?r denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the
court shall notify the requesting party. When a
request for hearing is granted, the court shall set
the matter for hearing or notify the requesting
party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and
time.
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a
courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of
points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered
to the judge hearing the matter at least two
working days before the date set for hearing.
Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies
and indicate the date and time of the hearing.
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk
of the court.
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made
at the time the parties file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed
waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at
least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after
that date without leave of the Court.
Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and noj and for good cause shown, the court may grant a
for an expedited disposition in any case
\ time is of the essence and compliance with the
isions of this rule would be impracticable or
Sere the motion does not raise significant legal isHes and could be resolved summarily.
r(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own
[ motion or at a party's request may direct arguments
itf any motion by telephone conference without court
|0j>pearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all
ilephone arguments and the rulings thereon if re" by counsel.
rided effective January 15, 1990; April 15,
91.)
f

4-502. Discovery procedures in civil cases,
at:
fM:To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery
tents.
"To establish a limitation on discovery procedures
tthin 30 days of trial.
| Applicability:

Rule 4-503

on the other parties and the date of service. The responding party shall file a similar certificate with the
clerk of the court.
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall
retain the original with a copy of the proof of service
affixed to it and serve a copy of the discovery request
and proof of service upon the opposing party or counsel. The party responding to the discovery request
shall retain the original with a copy of the proof of
service affixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses
and the proof of service upon the opposing party or
counsel. The discovery requests and response shall
not be filed with the clerk of the court unless the
court on motion and notice and for good cause shown
so orders.
(3) Any party filing a motion to compel compliance
with a discovery request or a motion which relies
upon the discovery response shall attach a copy of the
discovery request or response which is at issue in the
motion.
(4) Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of
Civil Procedure shall not be filed with the clerk of the
court except as provided in this Code or upon order of
the court for good cause shown.
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discovery proceedings in accordance with this rule. All discovery proceedings shall be completed, including all
responses thereto, and all depositions and other documents filed with the court no later than thirty (30)
days before the date set for trial of the case. The right
to conduct discovery proceedings within thirty (30)
days before trial shall be within the discretion of the
court. Motions to conduct discovery within thirty (30)
days before trial shall be presented to the judge assigned to the case upon notice to the other parties in
the action. In exercising its discretion, the court shall
take into consideration the necessity and reasons for
such discovery, the diligence or lack of diligence of
the parties seeking such discovery, whether permitting such discovery will prevent the case from going
to trial on the scheduled date, or result in prejudice to
any party. Nothing herein shall preclude or limit the
voluntary exchange of information or discovery by
stipulation of the parties at any time prior to the date
set for trial, but in no event shall such exchanges or
stipulations require a court to grant a continuance of
the trial date.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15,
1991.)
Rule 4-503. Requests for jury instructions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting
and requesting jury instructions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District, Circuit and
Justice Courts.
Statement of the Rule:

(1) All jury instruction requests shall be presented
to the court five days prior to the scheduled trial date
ft.This rule shall apply to the District, Juvenile and unless otherwise ordered by the court. The court, in
dt Courts.
its discretion, may allow the presentation of jury instructions at any time prior to the submission of the
itement of the Rule:
case to the jury. At the time of presentation to the
Parties conducting discovery under Rules 33, court, a copy of the requested instructions shall be
[ and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall furnished to opposing counsel.
(2) Jury instruction requests must be in writing
| notfilediscovery requests with the clerk of the court,
t but shall file only the original certificate of service and state in full the instruction requested. Each restating that the discovery requests have been served quest shall be upon a separate sheet of paper, the
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Dale M. Dorms
ATTORNEY AT LAW

P O BOX726
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?

M A I N STRECT

GUNNISON UTAH 8 4 6 3 4
(801) 5 2 8 7206
M A I N OFFICE

PO Box 6 9 5
2 0 SOUTH M A I N STREET

BftlGHAM CITY. UTAH 8 4 3 0 2
(801) 723 5210

AOMITTCO
UTAH S T A T * 8AM 119651
CALIFORNIA STATC BAM H9A8I
COIOMAOO STATC BAM H 9 0 8 )

August 31, 1993

Steven H. Lybbert
Attorney at Law
Suite 302 Felt Building
341 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Porter & Son's Construction vs. West American Finance
Corporation, et al.

Dear Mr. Lybbert:
Per your offer of settlement
submit the following.

my client has authorized me to

My client would be willing to accept $25,600.00 minus offset of
$3,135.00 on condition your client pay him interest at the legal
rate of interest of ten percent (10%) from the date of filing the
Notice of Lien October 30, 1992 and $1,500.00 towards his
attorney fees.
This counteroffer will be open for a period of ten (10) days and
if not accepted will thereafter be withdrawn. Please advise.
Very truly yours,

Dale M. Dorius
Attorney at Law
DMD:jp

EXHIBIT A

STEVEN H. LYBBERT
ATTORNEY AT LAW
Suite 302 Felt Building
341 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

REC'D OCT 2 0 1993

Telephone: (801) 363-0890
Telecopier: (801) 363-8512

nittcd also in California

October 19, 1993

Dale M. Dorius, Esq.
P.O. Box 895
Brigham City, UT 84302
Re:

Gary Porter etc* v. West American Finance Corp./ et al.

Dear Dale:
Enclosed please find my client's check for $15/591.42 in
full settlement of the above-referenced action.
Also enclosed is a sheet entitled Gary Porter Settlement
specifiying how the amount of the check was calculated and copies
of the two checks showing payment of amounts by West American
directly to Pioneer Sand & Gravel which were included on Mr.
Porter f s invoices.
Also enclosed is a Notice of Dismissal. Assuming you and
Mr. Porter find the numbers to be in order, once the check clears
please sign the Notice of Dismissal and return it to me so that I
can file it with the court.
Finally, please find a Release of Lien which I would like
Mr. Porter to sign. Once he has signed the Release of Lien,
please return it to me so that I can file it with the Salt Lake
County Recorder's office.
Don't hesitate to call me if you have any questions or
concerns.
Very truly yours,

Steven H. Lybbert
SL:cd:43A
Enclosures
cc: Stephen M. Harmsen
Blake T. Heiner

EXHIBIT B

GARY PORTER SETTLEMENT
Total Invoices;

#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6
#7
#8

9-17
9-15
9-16
9-12
9-09
9-21
10-03
10/20

$ 2,020.00
6,897.50
2,093.75
5,068.75
6,107.50
7,600.00
2,090.00
$25,237.50

Less Amounts Paid to Pioneer
per your invoice (see checks)
Less Settlement Amount
TOTAL DUE
Plus interest at 87„ from 10-30-92 to
10-30-93
TOTAL

-7,666.00
3,135.00
$14,436. 50
1,154.92
$15,591.42

STEVEN HXYBBSHT
ATTORNEY AT LAW
Suits 808 Beit Building
841 South Main Street
Salt take City, Utah 84111
Telephone; (801) 868-0860
TelccopLen (801) 868-8518

Admitted ttoo tn QeHfbea*

October 28/ 1993

VIA FAX
Dale M. DoriU8, Bsq.
P.O. B O X 895
Brigham City/ UT 84302
*e:

Gary Porter etc. v. West American Finance Cocpw et al.

Dear Dale:
Enclosed please find a copy of the front and back of West
American's check number 001018 payable to Pioneer Sand & Gravel.
It appears to me that the check vss deposited in Pioneer Sand &
Gravel's account at Draper Bank & Trust on December 3/ 1992.
Also enclosed is the same document entitled Gary Porter
Settlement which I enclosed with my October 19 letter to you.
The column of numbers on the far right are mine. After
recalculating interestt it appears that West American may still
owe $637.20. Mr* Harmsen is out of town. I will need to check
with him to determine vhy he did not add in the amount of
"invoice #8"# why he listed "invoice #3" at $2,093.75 rather than
at $2,633.75/ and why he listed "invoice #5" at $6,107*50 rather
than at $6/157.SO* If the discrepancies were cleriaal mistakes/
I will urge him to cut another check for $637.20 so that we can
finally resolve this matter.
Don't hesitate to call me if you have any questions or
concerns*
Very truly yours/

/}m
Steven H. Lybbert
3L:cdx43B
Enclosures
cc: Stephen M. Harmsen
Blake T. Heiner

Dale M. Dorius
ATTORNEY AT LAW
M A I N OFFICE

P.O. Box 805

BRANCH OFFICE

P.O. Box 7 2 6
47 MAIN STREET

GUNNISON. UTAH 8 4 6 3 4
(801) 528-7296

2 9 SOUTH M A I N STREET

BR1QHAM CITY. UTAH 8 4 3 0 2
1801) 723-9210

ADMITTED.
UTAH STATE BAH U 9 6 5 )
CALIFORNIA STATS BAR U968)
COLORADO STATE BAR U068I

October 28, 1993

Gary Porter
Porter & Son's Construction
9626 S. State St.
Sandy, UT 84070
Re:

Porter & Son's Construction vs. West American Finance
Corporation, et al.

Dear Mr. Porter:
Enclosed please find front and back of the $6,476.00 check.
Also, enclosed are previous settlement figures. It appears that
Mr. Harmson will owe you $637.20.
Please advise if this is
acceptable.
Very truly yours,

Dale M. Dorius
Attorney at Law
DMD:jp
Enclosures

EXHIBIT D

i

PGRTER & SONS
CONSTRUCTION

l >

QUALITY EXCAVATING & UTILITIES
8626 So. Stale Sandy, Ut. 84070 562-2532
Oct* 29/ 1993

i^

}

Rw; Porter & Sons vs.

west American Finance
Dear Dale*
This is in ansver to your letter of accounting dated 10-20-93.
None of Weot American'^ figures add up. The invoice amounts,
numbers one thru eight/ on their accounting statement add up
to |31/877*50 not $25,237*50 as stated* I am enclosing another
set of invoice copies which add up to $25,827.50.
I urn also enclosing a co^y of Pion««xa invoice showing their
truck rental charges for the Northcre*t Job* Their total of
$7,044.75 does not agree with West Aicericanj amounts as shown
on their checKs.
Pioneers truck rental charges $7044,75
West Americans checks #1018 - $8475
#103$ - $1190,63
$7666.63
The tollowing is an accounting which is correct provided
West Americans check for $6476 is valid* Pioneer Sand & Gravel
can rind no record of this payment.
rtw«t iiufctx i c a n
Total invoices
less Pioneers invoice
Total Due
Plus interest at 8%
for 12 months

settlement
$25,827,50
7,044,75
$18,782.75

$ I,500.22
$20,282^97
The amount $3135 i« dis-aiiowBd because I assumed incorrectly
that this was the amount that West American paid Pioneer.
It these figures are not accepted, please proceed with a
trial date immediately*
Sine* r e l y

Jgyd^'
EXHIBIT E

STEVEN H.LYBBERT
ATTORNEY AT LAW
Suite aOU Felt Building
M l South Main Street
Salt Luke City, Utah S t i l l
Taephooej (801) 36&-0890
Tekeopiert (801) 863-8513

AdBttrtftiwiaCtlifona.

November 5/ 1993

VIA FAX
Dale M. Dorius* Bsq.
P.O. Box 895
Brigham City* UT 84302
Re:

Gary Porter etc, v. West American Finance Corp., et al.

Dear Dale:
Enclosed is the same document entitled Gary Porter
Settlement which I enclosed with my October 19 letter and my
October 28 letter to you. I have now had an opportunity to
discuss the discrepancies in invoice numbers 3/ 5 and 8 with
Steve Harmaen.
Mr. Harmsen listed invoice #3 at $2,093-75 rather than at
$2/633.75 because the next to last line of invoice #2 (the one
dated "Tuea 9-15" containa a $540 charge to pioneer truck for 12
loads at $540.00. The first line of invoice »3 (the one dated
9-16-92) is the same charge. In other words, invoice numbers 2
and 3 contain a $540.00 double billing*
Mr. Harmsen listed "invoice #5tt at $6/107.50 rather than at
$6/157.50 because the fourth item on that invoice (the one dated
9-9-92) is for 11% hours at $100 per hour/ but the "balance"
column states $1/200.00. It should only be $1/150.00.
By my calculations/ West American Finance owes another
$216*00 ($200 principal and $16 interest) in order to finally
settle this matter. Please consult with Mr. Porter. If that is
acceptable/ please contact me and I will promptly forward a check
in that amount« Don't hesitate to call me if you have any
questions or concerns.
Very truly yours*

Steven H« Lybbert
SL:cd:43C
enclosures
cc: Stephen M. Harmsen

EXHIBIT F

GARY PORTER SETTLEMENT
Total Invoicesi

#1
#2

#3
04
#5
#6
#7
#8

y-17
9-15
9-16
9-12
9-09
9-21
10-03
10/20

Leas Amounts Paid to Pioneer
per your invoice (see checks)
Less Settlement Amount

$ 2,020.00 y
6,897:50/
2,093.75

fi7^

l

>"

5,068.75'
6,107.50

_
b,irv<S*

•7^00.60 7*>
2,090.00"

-p&fSm^

i-<i *****
(, t,t,r-

«*7,666.00
3,135.00 - „ ?jT>

TOTAL DUE

$14,436.50

Plus interest at 87. from 10-30-92 to
10-30-93
TOTAL

1,154.92
$15,591.42

.c*

I*. °; *• **

STEVEN H. LYBBERT
ATTORNEY AT LAW

€CD NOV 151993

Suite 302 Felt Building
M l South Main Slave!
Salt Lake City, I Hah 84111

Admitted also in California

Telephone: (801) M3-0890
Telecopier: (801) tttitt-8512

November 12, 1993

Dale M. Dorius; Esq.
P.O. Box 895
Brigham City/ UT 84302
Re:

Gary Porter etc. v. West American Finance Corp./ et al.

Dear Dale:
Enclosed please find my client's check for $216.00 which/
when added to the $15/591.42 previously tendered/ is full settlement of the above-referenced action.
On October 19/ 1993 I sent you an original Notice of
Dismissal and an original Release of Lien. Please sign the
Notice of Dismissal and return it to me so that I can file it
with the court. Please obtain Mr. Porter's signature on the
Release of Lien/ then return it to me so that I can record it
with the Salt Lake County Recorder's office.
Don't hesitate to call me if you have any questions or
concerns.
Very truly yours/

Steven H. Lybbert
SL:cd:43D
Enclosure
cc: Stephen M. Harmsen
Blake T. Heiner

EXHIBIT G

Dale M. Dorius
ATTORNEY AT LAW
MAIN OFFICE

P.O. BOX 893
29 SOUTH MAIN STREET

IRIQHAM CITY. UTAH 8 4 3 0 2
(801) 723-5219

BRANCH

OFFICE

P.O. Box 7 2 6
47 MAIN STREET

GUNNISON. UTAH 8 4 6 3 4
(801) 528-7296
AOMITTCO:
UTAH STATC BAH (19651
CALIFORNIA STATC BAR (1966)
COLORADO STATE BAR (1968)

November 23, 1993

Gary Porter
Porter & Son's Construction
9626 S. State St.
Sandy, UT 84070
Re:

Porter & Son's Construction vs. West American Finance
Corporation, et al.

Dear Mr- Porter:
In reviewing this file it appears that the offer of settlement
was for the principal amount due and owing together with 8%
interest.
The sums tendered appear to be those amounts after
giving credit for the Pioneer account.
Would you please in writing calculate your claim that you are
still owed $3,100.00 over the offer. Enclosed please find a copy
of your original accounting.
I again enclose copies of Mr.
Lybbert's accounting in this regard. I would appreciate if you
would Fax me your accounting.
yours,

Dale MXjDorius
Attorney at Law
DMD:j p
Enclosures

EXHIBIT H

STEVEN H.LYBBERT
ATTORNEY AT IAW
Suite 808 Pelt Building
841 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone* (801) 368-0890
Admitted «tao la CullfornU

Telecoplen (801) 863-8818

December 13, 1993

Dala H. Doriua, Esq.
P.O. Box 895
Brigham City, UT 84302
Raj

Gary Porter etc* v. Waat American Finance Corp., et ale

Daar Dalai
Bnoloaad plaaaa find a oopy of tha answer I filed today to
tha amandad complaint in tha above-referenced matter. In view of
tha exchange of correspondence that haa occurred in thia case/ I
am confidant tha court will find that there has been an accord
and satisfaction or Mr, Porterfa clairae. Furthert I do not
believe Judge Hanaen ia going to believe that Mr. Porter thought
that the ?3/135 discount was intended to ba a credit for money
paid to Pioneer Trucking by West American when Neat American in
fact paid over $7,600 to PioneerHere ia Keat American'a final offert If Mr. Porter will
aign a release of lien/ and if you will sign a stipulation of
dismissal, and if both documents are returned to ma by the end of
thia week (or copies faxed to me and the originals mailed by the
end of this week) Meat American will pay an additional $500*00 to
your cliant# payable thirty days after the case ia diamiaaed.
As you might imagine> the existence of a mechanics lien on a
condominium project pretty much stays tha owner from selling
units in the condominium complex. If the offer set forth above
ia not acceptable/ and if the court eventually finds an accord
and aatiafaction to have taken place/ Heat American will sue Mr.
Porter for any loss it sustains as a result of its inability to
sell oondo units during the pendancy of thia action.
Also enclosed la a stipulation of dismissal for your
signature* Please call roe if you have any questions or concerns.
Very truly yours *

Steven H. Lybbect

EXHIBIT I

BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN
A Professional Law Corporation

Laird Law Office:
1600 Laird Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
(801) 582-6737
Fax 582-6737

Highland Law Office:
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
(801) 273-3962
Fax 273-3367

May 14, 1994
VIA FACSIMILE
Dale Dorius, Esq.
Brigham City, Utah
RE: Porter v. West American Finance Corporation
Dear Dale:
I know that you are not happy with my protestations in this matter. Despite your
natural resentment against the statements I have made, I hope that you will see that the
most important thing that happens right now is that Gary's position be protected in this
litigation.
Gary is adamant that he did not agree or authorize you to settle. Please see the
Order which Judge Hanson signed. He granted summary judgment because Lybbert stated
in his affidavit that "attorney Dale M. Dorius, representing plaintiff, sometime between
November 5,1993 and November 11,1993" reached a final settlement with Lybbert. If this
is true, then tell me in a facsimile transmission this coming Monday and I will drop my
attempts to change Judge Hanson's order. If this is not true, then please provide me with
an affidavit so stating so I can protect Gary's interests in this case.
Thank you in advance for your professionalism and assistance.in this regard.
Yours very truly,

Brian W^iteffensei
Enclosure

EXHIBIT J

D A U M. OORIUS #0903
Attorney for:
P.O. Box U
29 South Main Street
Brlflhom City. Utah 84302
723-3219

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GARY A. PORTER dba PORTER &
SON'S CONSTRUCTION,

AFFIDAVIT OF DALE M. DORIUS

)

Civil No. 930902266

Plaintiff,

vs.
WEST AMERICAN FINANCE CORP.,
a Utah Corporation and
OLYMPUS BANK,
Defendant.
DALE

M.

DORIUS,

being

first

duly

sworn and on his oath

states as follows:
1.

That I

represented Porter

& Son's

Construction in the

above matter.
2.

That

numerous

settlement negotiations were conducted

with my client and the Defendant, together with

their respective

attorneys.
3.
amount

That there was an agreed to settlement of the principal
owed

to

$3,135.00, and

Plaintiff

plus

Defendant would

eight

percent

interest minus

drop the $11,000.00 counterclaim

set off.
4.

There was not a finalized agreement as to the amount the

Defendant could offset for the Pioneer Truck charges•

EXHIBIT K

5.

The outstanding

issue is whether or not Defendant paid

Pioneer Trucking, and if these amounts are proper

offsets. This

appears to be the only dispute in regard to the settlement.

DATED this 16th day of May, 1994.

VPJfcGE M.
SUBSCRIBED

and

sworn

to

before

2

me this 16th day of May,

